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PEOPLE v. DAVIS: CALIFORNIA'S MURDER 
STATUTE AND THE REQUIREMENT OF 
VIABILITY FOR FETAL MURDER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In People v. Davis, 1 the California Supreme Court held 
that the viabilitr of a fetus is not required for a murder con-
viction under California Penal Code section 187(a).3 The Davis 
court ruled that the third-party killing of a fetus with malice 
aforethought is murder under California's murder statute so 
long as the state can show that the fetus has progressed be-
yond the embryonic stage of seven to eight weeks.4 This deci-
sion overturned eighteen years of California appellate court 
holdings.5 
1. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994) (per Lucas, C.J., joined by 
Arabian, J.; Kennard, J., concurring, joined by Stone, J.; Baxter, J., concurring and 
dissenting, joined by George, J.; Mosk, J., dissenting). 
2. "Viability is that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn 
child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-
supportive systems." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1565-66 (6th ed. 1990). See infra 
notes 15 and accompanying text for the United States Supreme Court's definition 
of viability. 
3. Davis, 872 P.2d at 593. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988) reads: 
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being or fetus with malice afore-
thought." [d. 
4. Davis, 872 P.2d at 602. 
5. [d. at 601. Since People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Ct. App. 1976), 
every California appellate court that addressed the issue of whether viability is re-
quired to constitute murder, required fetal viability. See infra notes 17-26 and 
accompanying text for a historical discussion of the judicial interpretation of § 
187(a) prior to Davis. 
579 
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II. BACKGROUND 
In 1970, California's murder statute, codified in Penal 
Code section 187, read: "Murder is the unlawful killing of a 
human being with malice aforethought."6 The same year, in 
Keeler v. Superior Court,7 the California Supreme Court held 
that a man who killed a fetus carried by his former wife could 
not be prosecuted for murder.s The Keeler court reasoned that 
the legislature probably intended the phrase ''human being" to 
mean a person who had been born alive.9 
Although the legislative session was more than halfway 
over, and the deadline for introducing new bills had passed, 
the majority floor leader of the Assembly took immediate ac-
tion to permit the legislature to overrule Keeler.10 Thus, the 
legislature amended Penal Code section 187(a) by adding with-
in the proscription of the statute the killing of a fetus. ll The 
amended statute now reads: "Murder is the unlawful killing of 
a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought."12 
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988) (emphasis added). 
7. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970). 
8. Id. at 618. 
9. Id. at 622. In Keeler, Teresa and Robert Keeler were divorced. Id. at 618. 
At the time of the divorce, Teresa was already pregnant by Ernest Vogt. Id. Five 
months later, Robert came upon Teresa driving on a rural road. Robert said, "I 
hear you're pregnant." Id. When he looked at her stomach, he became outraged 
and said, "I'm going to stomp it out of you." Id. He then hit Teresa in the face 
and pushed his knee into her stomach. Id. Teresa survived, but the fetus was 
stillborn. Id. Doctors concluded that if the fetus was born at the time of the inci-
dent, it would have had a 75% to 96% chance of survival. Id. at 619. 
10. See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 608 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting) 
Justice Mosk states: 
[AI fellow legislator relinquished sponsorship of a pending 
bill on a wholly different subject-Assembly Bill No. 
81S-and on June 24 the majority leader "amended" that 
bill by deleting its original text in its entirety and replac-
ing it with his new version of section 187. In quick suc-
cession the bill was then amended twice more in the 
Assembly (July 10 & 17), passed and sent to the Senate 
(July 27), amended in the Senate (Aug. 7), and passed 
and returned to the Assembly (Aug. 20), where the Senate 
amendments were concurred in the next day (Aug. 21). 
Id. (quoting Comment, Is the Intentional Killing of an Unborn Child Homicide?, 2 
PACIFIC L.J. 170, 174 (1970». 
11. See Stats. 1970, ch. 1311, § I, p. 2440. 
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988) (emphasis added). Despite the addi-
tion of the term "fetus," the amended statute states that it does not apply to abor-
2
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In its 1973 opinion in Roe v. Wade,;3 the United States 
Supreme Court held that, in the context of a mother's decision 
to have an abortion, the state has no legitimate interest in 
protecting the fetus until it reaches the point of viability.l4 
The Court explained that viability occurs when the fetus reach-
es the capability of meaningful life outside of the mother's 
womb.15 
After Roe, a number of California appellate courts con-
strued the term "fetus" in section 187(a), to mean a "viable 
fetus. ,,16 In People v. Smith,17 the first of these cases, the 
court of appeal held that viability is an essential element of 
fetal murder under section 187(a).18 The Smith court reasoned 
that "one cannot destroy independent human life prior to the 
time it has come into existence."19 Thus, the court main-
tained, before viability, the state has no interest in protecting 
the fetus from abortion. 20 
The Smith court relied on Roe v. Wade in acknowledging a 
woman's constitutional right to abort her fetus before viabili-
tiona complying with the Therapeutic Abortion Act, performed by a doctor when 
the death of the mother was substantially certain in the absence of an abortion, 
or whenever the mother solicited, aided, and otherwise chose to abort the fetus. 
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(b) (West Supp. 1971). 
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
14. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
15. 1d. The Court stated that "viability" generally occurs at approximately 28 
weeks, but may occur as early as 24 weeks. 1d. at 160. At the point of viability, 
the Court ruled, the state may restrict abortion. 1d. at 163. 
16. See, e.g., People v. Hamilton, 774 P.2d 730 (Cal. 1989); People v. 
Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1990); People v. R.P. Smith, 234 Cal. 
Rptr. 142 (Ct. App. 1987); People v. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Ct. App. 1978); 
People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Ct. App. 1976). 
17. 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Ct. App. 1976). 
18. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 504. In Smith, the defendant beat his wife who 
was 12 to 15 weeks pregnant, saying he did not want the baby to live. 1d. at 500. 
His wife miscarried her fetus as a direct result of the beating. 1d. At trial, the 
parties stipulated that the fetus was not viable at the time of the miscarriage. 1d. 
The trial court then dismissed the murder charge, holding that viability is an 
essential element. 1d. The court of appeal affirmed a trial court's ruling dismiss-
ing the murder charge and held that viability is an essential element under § 
187(a). 1d. at 504. 
19. 1d. at 502 
20. 1d. 
3
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ty.21 The court explained that: 
Implicit in Wade is the conclusion that as a 
matter of Constitutional law the destruction of a 
nonviable fetus is not a taking of a human life. 
It follows that such destruction cannot consti-
tute murder or other form of homicide, whether 
committed by a mother, a father ... or a third 
person.22 
Since Smith, subsequent cases have similarly interpreted 
California's feticide statute as requiring a viability limita-
tion.23 In 1990, the court of appeal in People v. Henderson24 
recognized that, even though the statute does not expressly 
refer~nce viability, decisional law interpreting section 187(a), 
has limited "criminal liability for its violation to viable fetus-
es.,,25 The Henderson court considered the definition of fetal 
viability to be well-established and concluded that fetal viabili-
ty occurs when the fetus is capable of independent existence 
outside the mother's womb.26 
Despite the appellate court decisions inferring a viability 
requirement to convict a defendant of fetal murder under sec-
tion 187(a), the California Supreme Court had never addressed 
this issue before People v. Davis. 27 
21. 1d. 
22. 1d. at 502. The court defined viability as "having attained such form and 
development of organs as to be normally capable of living outside the uterus." 1d. 
at 503 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DIeT. 2548 (3d ed. 1966). 
23. See, e.g., People v. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Ct. App. 1978) (rejecting 
the assertion that § 187(a) is unconstitutionally vague because it does not specify 
the stage of development of the fetus in the statute); People v. R.P. Smith, 234 
Cal. Rptr. 142 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that viability of a fetus is a constitutional 
prerequisite for murder of a fetus by extension of Roe). 
24. 275 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1990). 
25. See id. at 854. 
26. See id. at 853. 
27. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 597. In People v. Hamilton, 774 P.2d 730 (Cal. 
1989), the California Supreme Court did not consider whether §187(a) should im-
pose criminal liability for only the killing of viable fetuses. Hamilton, 774 P.2d at 
747. The defendant there was convicted of the murder of his wife and 7-month old 
fetus. 1d. at 733. On appeal, the defendant asserted that the trial court's jury 
instruction was incorrect and that it misled the jury to believe they could convict 
him if the baby could be born alive. 1d. at 747. The California Supreme Court de-
termined that it did not need to address the d~fendant's contention because there 
was uncontradicted evidence that the fetus was viable under any definition of vi-
ability; thus, even if the instructional error had occurred, the defendant could not 
4
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III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On March 1, 1991, Maria Flores went to cash her welfare 
check at a check cashing store with her twenty-month-old son, 
Hector.28 At the time, she was twenty-three to twenty-five 
weeks pregnant.29 As Flores left the store, defendant Robert 
Davis pulled a gun and demanded the money from Flores' 
purse.30 When Flores refused to give Davis her purse, Davis 
shot her in the chest and fled the scene.31 
Flores underwent emergency surgery as a result of the 
shooting, but the next day, her fetus was stillborn as a direct 
result of her blood loss, low blood pressure, and state of 
shock.32 The police subsequently apprehended Davis and 
charged him with assault and robbery of Flores and the mur-
der of her fetus. 33 Moreover, the prosecution charged the spe-
cial circumstance ofrobbery-murder.34 
The trial court instructed the jury that it had to find 
Flores' fetus was viable before it could convict Davis of mur-
der.35 The jury then convicted Davis of murder of a fetus dur-
have been prejudiced. Id. 




32. Id. During Flores' surgery, although doctors sutured the existing holes in 
her uterine wall to prevent additional bleeding, no further obstetrical measures 
were taken due to the immaturity of her fetus. Id. At trial, the prosecution's med-
ical experts testified that the fetus's statistical chances of survival outside the 
womb were between 7 and 47 percent. Id. The defense medical expert, however, 
stated the chances were only 2 or 3 percent. Id. None of the experts testified that 
the survival of the fetus was probable. Id. 
33. Davis, 872 P.2d at 593. 
34. Id. When a murder occurs during the commission of a state listed felony, 
the defendant may be charged with murder with special circumstances. If the de-
fendant is convicted, the result may be the death penalty. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 
190.2(a) (West 1988). 
35. Davis, 872 P.2d at 593. California Penal Code §187(a) does not expressly 
require viability as an element of fetal murder, but the trial court based its in-
structions on prior court of appeal jury instructions requiring the viability of a 
ietus for a fetal murder conviction. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of these prior cases. 
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ing the course of a robbery,36 assault with a firearm,37 and 
robbery.3s Furthermore, the jury found true the special cir-
cumstance allegation.39 
On appeal, Davis argued that the trial court prejudicially 
erred by not giving California's standard viability instruc-
tion.40 Specifically, Davis argued, the trial court should have 
defined viability as "probability of survival" instead of the 
lower threshold "possibility of survival.1141 
Rather than simply examining Davis' alleged viability 
instructional error, however, the court of appeal proceeded to 
address the state's contention that viability is not necessary to 
convict a defendant of fetal murder.42 The court then agreed 
with the state and, contrary to prior decisions, held that viabil-
ity is not a required element of fetal murder under section 
187(a).43 Nevertheless, the court of appeal reversed Davis' 
murder conviction and set aside the special circumstance find-
ing.44 The court believed that application of its unprecedented 
interpretation of the parental consent statute to Davis would 
violate his due process rights.45 
36. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 
190.2(a)(2) (West 1988). 
37. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990) (amended 1995). 
38. Davis, 872 P.2d at 593. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (West 1988). 
39. [d. Although the jury found true the special circumstance allegation, the 
prosecutor did not seek the death penalty. Consequently, Davis was sentenced to 
life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus five years for the use of a fire-
arm. [d. 
40. [d. The standard jury instruction, CALJIC No. 8.10 (5th ed. 1988), pro-
vides: "A viable human fetus is one that has attained such form and development 
of organs as to be normally capable of living outside of the uterus." [d. 
41. [d. CALJIC No. 8.10 prevents the jury from convicting a defendant of fetal 
murder unless there is a "probability" of the fetus' survival. Rather than giving 
the standard viability instruction, CALJIC No. 8.10, the trial court instead gave 
the jury an instruction that allowed it to convict the defendant if it found that the 
fetus had a possibility of survival. Davis, 872 P.2d at 593. 
The trial court's jury instruction stated: "Within the meaning of Penal Code 
section 187, subdivision (a), as charged in Count One, a fetus is viable when it 
has achieved the capability for independent existence; that is, when it is possible 
for it to survive the trauma of birth, although with artificial medical aid." Davis, 
872 P.2d at 593. 
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In a 6-1 decision on the viability issue and a 4-3 decision 
to remand because of due process considerations, the California 
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal judgment in its 
entirety.46 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
. Initially, in People v. Davis,47 the California Supreme 
Court discussed in depth the historical development of 
California's feticide statute.46 The court then performed its 
own statutory interpretation and concluded that fetal viability 
is not a required element to convict a defendant of murder 
under the statute.49 Finally, the Davis court discussed Robert 
Davis' due process challenge and analyzed whether the trial 
court's instructional error was prejudicial.50 
A. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF THE CALIFORNIA MURDER 
STATUTE 
After discussing prior appellate court decisions that had 
inferred a viability requirement as an element of fetal mur-
der,51 the California Supreme Court emphasized that it had 
never determined whether such an element is necessary.52 
The Davis court then embarked upon its own statutory inter-
pretation of California's murder statute.53 The Davis court 
began its analysis with a discussion of Roe v. Wade54 princi-
ples.55 
46. [d. 
47. 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994). 
48. See id. at 594-97. The Background section of this Note is an abbreviation 
of the Davis court's "Historical Background" section of its opinion. See supra notes 
6-26 and accompanying text for the author's summary of the California Supreme 
Court's discussion. 
49. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 599-600. See infra notes 51-96 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the Davis court's statutory interpretation. 
50. See id. at 600-02. See infra notes 97-108 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion on the due process challenge and instructional error. 
51. See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of these 
decisions. 
52. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 597. 
53. See id. at 597-600. 
54. 410 U.s. 113 (1973). 
55. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 597. 
7
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1. Roe v. Wade Principles Do Not Apply 
The Davis court commenced its Roe v. Wade analysis by 
announcing that Roe principles are inapplicable to a statute 
that criminalizes the killing of a fetus without the mother's 
consent. 56 The court explained that Roe did not rule that the 
state's interest becomes legitimate only after viability. 57 Rath-
er, the Roe decision "forbids the state's protection of the 
unborn's interest only when these interests conflict with the 
constitutional rights of the prospective parent."58 Thus, the 
Davis court maintained, despite Roe v. Wade and its progeny, a 
court may recognize an unborn fetus' interests in situations 
where these interests do not conflict with the mother's right to 
56. See id. Davis claimed that the fetus did not obtain the protection of Penal 
Code § 187{a) because the fetus could have been legally aborted at the time it 
was killed. See id. Davis relied on Smith and its progeny to assert that, if the 
fetus had not attained independent human life status under Roe, it had not 
achieved "viability" under Smith, and therefore, he could not be prosecuted under 
PENAL CODE § 187{a) for the fetus's murder. See id. See supra notes 17-26 for a 
discussion of Smith and its progeny. 
57. [d. See also Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting 
the Potentiality of Human Life 22 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 144 (1985). Professor 
Parness states: "By holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not cover the 
unborn, the Supreme Court was left with only one constitutionally mandated right, 
that of the mother's privacy, to be considered along with the legitimate state in-
terest in protecting an unborn's potential life." [d. 
58. Davis, 872 P.2d at 597. Parness, supra note 57, at 144. Other scholars 
agree with Professor Parness. See, e.g., King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A 
Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647 (1979). See 
also Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and Other 
Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 616 (1987). Professor Forsythe ex-
plains: 
"While the decision in Roe declares that the state may 
not protect the potential life of a fetus from the moment 
of conception, it does so in the narrow context of the 
mother's abortion decision." Under Roe v. Wade, therefore, 
the right to an abortion is encompassed within the 
woman's right to constitutional privacy. The fetus is not a 
'person' for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and has no Constitutional rights that would outweigh the 
exercise of the woman's Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
The fetus' rights and the state's interest, or lack of inter-
est, in protecting maternal health and in protecting the 
life of the fetus, were distinctly balanced against the 
woman's right to privacy in the context of consensual 
abortion. 
[d. (quoting Parness, supra note 57, at 97). 
8
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personal autonomy. 59 The court stated that, "when the state's 
interest in protecting the potential life of a fetus is not coun-
terbalanced against a mother's privacy right to an abortion, or 
other equivalent interest, the state's interest should pre-
vail. 1>60 
2. Viability Is Not a Requirement in Other States 
Having determined that Roe principles do not require a 
fetal viability element to convict a defendant of fetal murder, 
the Davis court next examined other states' statutes which do 
not require viability to convict a defendant of feticide.sl Spe-
cifically, the Davis court focused on Minnesota and Illinois, 
where constitutional challenges to fetal murder statutes have 
failed.62 In those states, the challenges were based on the 
statutes' failure to distinguish between viable and nonviable 
fetuses. s3 
a. Minnesota: State v. Merrill 
In 1990, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed equal 
protection and due process challenges to the state's feticide 
statute64 by a defendant who murdered a woman and her 
59. Davis,. 872 P.2d at 597. 
60. Id. 
61. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 598-99. The court cited Minnesota, Arizona, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Indiana, North Dakota and Utah as states that do not require fetal via-
bility to convict a defendant of murder. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 
(A)(5) (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.2, 9-2.1, 9-3.2 (1991) (currently 
found at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720 para. 5/9-1.2, -2.1. -3.2 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Burns 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(7), § 14:32.5-:32.8 
(West 1986 & Supp. 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-01 to 12.1-17.1-04 (Supp. 
1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (1990). 
62. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 598-99. Minnesota and Illinois courts rejected con-
stitutional challenges to their respective state statutes on the ground that "protec-
tion of a woman's privacy interest in the abortion context is not applicable to a 
nonconsensual murder of the unborn child." Id. at 598. 
63. Id. 
64. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2661(1) (West 1987). The statute includes in its 
definition of first degree murder the killing "of an unborn child with premeditation 
and with intent to effect the death of the unborn child or of another." Id. 
9
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four-week-old embryo.65 In State v. Merrill,66 the defendant 
argued that the Minnesota feticide statute violated constitu-
tional principles due to its failure to distinguish between viable 
and nonviable fetuses.67 
The defendant in Merrill asserted that the Minnesota 
statute violated equal protection principles because, by not 
requiring viability as an element for fetal murder, the statute 
exposed him to serious penal consequences.68 To the contrary, 
the defendant pointed out, mothers and doctors who deliberate-
ly terminate nonviable fetuses are not subject to criminal sanc-
tions.69 In short, the defendant argued that similarly situated 
persons were treated disparately by the statute.70 
In rejecting the defendant's equal protection challenge, the 
Merrill court found that a defendant who assaults a woman 
and destroys her fetus without her consent is not the same as 
a woman who elects to terminate her pregnancy legally.71 
The court explained that, "in the case of abortion, the woman's 
choice and the doctor's actions are based on the woman's con-
stitutionally protected right to privacy.,,72 The court further 
stated: "Roe v. Wade protects the woman's right of choice; it 
does not protect, much less confer on an assailant, a third-
party unilateral right to destroy the fetus."73 Accordingly, the 
Merrill court concluded, the Minnesota feticide statute does not 
violate equal protection principles by failing to distinguish 
between viable and nonviable fetuses. 74 
65. See State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990). 
66. [d. 
67. [d. at 321. 
68. [d. 
69. [d. 
70. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 321. 
71. [d. at 321-22. 
72. [d. at 322. The Merrill court articulated that the right to privacy includes 
the woman's choice to terminate or continue the pregnancy without state interfer-
ence unless the state's interest in protecting the potentiality of human life be-
comes compelling. [d. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. The defendant also asserted that feticide statute violated equal protec-
tion because an unborn is not a "person" under Roe and is not protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. [d. The Merrill court rejected this assertion and reasoned 
that the state's feticide statute protects the potentiality of human life without 
directly or indirectly impinging on the mother's privacy rights. [d. The court ex-
plained that Roe focused on protecting the woman from governmental interference 
10
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The defendant in Merrill also claimed that Minnesota's 
feticide statute75 is so vague that it violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.76 Specifically, the de-
fendant asserted that the statute fails to give fair warning of 
the prohibited conduct.77 
The Mer-rill court rejected the due process argument, ex-
plaining that the "fair warning" rule has never been interpret-
ed to excuse criminal liability because the actual victim was 
not the one that a defendant originally intended to assault.7S 
The court explained that there is always a possibility that a 
female victim of childbearing years might be pregnant.79 
Thus, the Merrill court concluded, Minnesota's feticide statute 
provides the requisite fair warning.so 
b. Illinois: People v. Ford 
Additionally, the Davis court examined an lllinois opinion 
which relied substantially on Merrill.s1 As in Merrill, the llli-
nois Court of Appeal in People v. Fords2 addressed assertions 
that the state's feticide statuteS3 violates equal protection and 
and acknowledged that the state still has a legitimate interest in protecting the 
potentiality of human life. [d. Consequently, the state retains an interest in pro-
tecting an unborn child whether the embryo is viable or not. [d. The court con-
cluded that even laws which directly impact abortion are constitutional so long as 
the statute itself does not unduly impinge on the woman's decision. [d. 
75. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2661(1). 
76. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 322. 
77. [d. at 323. The Merrill court noted the defendant argued that it is unfair 
to impose on the murderer of a woman an additional penalty for murder of her 
unborn child when neither the assailant nor the pregnant woman may have been 
aware of the pregnancy. 1d. 
78. 1d. The court noted that just because a perpetrator did not intend to kill a 
specific victim does not mean he lacked a fair warning that he would be held 
similarly accountable as if the victim had been the one intended. [d. 
79. [d. 
80. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 323. 
81. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 598-99. 
82. 581 N.E.2d 1189, 1197 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). In Ford, the defendant was 
convicted under the Illinois feticide statute for killing his 17 -year-old step-
daughter's five and one half-month old fetus. 1d. at 1190. 
83. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.1 (1985) (current version at ILL. REV. 
STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/9-1.2 (Smith-Hurd 1993». The statute states: "A person com-
mits the offense of intentional homicide of an unborn child if . . . he [or shel . . . 
(1) either intended to cause the death of or to do great bodily harm to the preg-
11
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due process principles for failing to distinguish between viable 
and nonviable fetuses. 84 
Upon determination that the Illinois feticide statute did 
not affect any protectable interest held by the defendant, the 
Ford court applied a rational basis standard of review to the 
defendant's equal protection challenge.s5 To pass constitution-
al muster, the state's feticide statute needed only a rational 
relation to a valid legislative purpose.88 Because it found that 
the feticide statute bears a rational relationship to the valid 
legislative purpose of protecting the potentiality of human life, 
the Ford court concluded that the statute does not violate 
equal protection principles.s7 After dispensing of the 
nant woman or her unborn child . . . (2) he knew that his acts created a strong 
probability of death or great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn 
child: and (3) he knew that she was pregnant . . . . " [d. (emphasis added). 
84. See Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189. The defendant argued that Illinois' feticide 
statute violates equal protection principles because under Roe, a woman can termi-
nate her nonviable fetus without incurring serious penalties. [d. To the contrary, 
the defendant pointed out, by destroying a nonviable fetus, the defendant faced 
capital penalties. [d. Consequently, the defendant argued that he and a pregnant 
woman are similarly situated, but treated differently by the statute. [d. 
The defendant's argument in Ford was identical to the argument made by 
the defendant in State v. Merrill. See supra notes 64-80 and accompanying text for 
a discussion of Merrill. 
85. Ford, 581 N.E.2d at 1200. The court stated: 
The court must first determine the proper level of scru-
tiny to be applied to the challenged classification. When 
the statute under consideration affects a fundamental 
right, or discriminates against a suspect class, courts will 
apply a strict scrutiny test and only uphold it if it serves 
a compelling State interest. If neither a fundamental right 
nor a suspect class is affected by this statute, a rational 
basis test is used. Under this analysis, a statutory classi-
fication must bear a rational relationship to a valid legis-
lative purpose. The classification created by the statute 
will only be declared violative of the equal protection 
clause if based on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit 
of a legitimate State goal. 
[d. at 1199-1200. 
86. [d. at 1200. 
87. [d. The court noted: 
[AI pregnant woman who chooses to terminate her preg-
nancy and the defendant who assaults a pregnant woman, 
causing the death of her fetus, are not similarly situated. 
A woman consents to the abortion and has an absolute 
right, at least during the first trimester of the pregnancy, 
to choose to terminate the pregnancy. A woman has a 
privacy interest in terminating her pregnancy; however, 
12
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defendant's equal protection argument, the Ford court then 
rejected the defendant's due process challenge as well.88 
3. Conclusion of the Davis Majority 
The Davis court utilized both Ford and Merrill to illustrate 
the constitutionality of criminalizing the killing of a nonviable 
fetus and the legislature's freedom to impose upon the killer of 
a fetus the same penalty as is prescribed for the murder of a 
human being.89 The Davis court reasoned that, like Minnesota 
and Illinois, California is a "code state,"90 thus the legislature 
"has the exclusive province to define by statute what acts con-
stitute a crime. "91 The court concluded that nothing prevents 
the legislature from protecting the potentiality of human life; 
"when the mother's privacy interests are not involved, the leg-
islature may determine whether, and at what point, it should 
protect life inside a mother's womb from homicide."92 
Consequently, the Davis court held that viability is not an 
element of fetal murder under section 187(a).93 The court in-
terpreted the legislative history as suggesting that the term 
"fetus" was deliberately left undefined in the face of divided 
legislative views about its meaning.94 Nevertheless, the court 
ld. at 1199. 
defendant has no such interest. The statute simply pro· 
tects the mother and the unborn child from the intention· 
al wrongdoing of a third party. 
88. See id. at 1200·01. As in State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990), 
the defendant argued that the feticide statute violates due process principles be· 
cause it is unconstitutionally vague. See supra notes 64·80 and accompanying text 
for the discussion of Merrill. The Ford court ruled that the defendant did not have 
standing to challenge the statute on vagueness grounds. See Ford, 581 N.E.2d at 
1201. Nevertheless, the court added, even if the defendant had standing to chal· 
lenge the statute, the fetal homicide statute is not unconstitutionally vague. ld. 
The Ford court reasoned that the statute only requires proof that the entity exist· 
ing in the mother's womb was alive, but is now dead as a result of defendant's 
actions. ld. 
89. Davis, 872 P.2d at 599. 
90. The term "code state" refers to the legislature's exclusive province to define 
statutorily what acts constitute a crime. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 6 (West 1988). 
91. Davis, 872 P.2d at 599. 
92.ld. 
93. ld. 
94. ld. The court believed that the legislature purposely left the term "fetus" 
undefined after debate on the subject. ld. The court stated: "The Legislature was 
13
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explained, the term "fetus" is generally defined as "the unborn 
offspring in the postembryonic period, after major structures 
have been outlined."95 Because this period occurs in humans 
seven to eight weeks after fertilization, the court concluded 
that the killing of a fetus with malice aforethought by a third 
party is murder so long as the state can show that the fetus 
has progressed beyond the seven to eight week embryonic 
stage.96 
B. VIABILITY MAy NOT BE REQUIRED TO CONVICT A 
DEFENDANT OF FETAL MURDER, BUT THE CASE MUST STILL 
BE REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Although the Davis majority held that fetal viability is not 
a required element to convict a defendant of fetal murder, it 
agreed with the court of appeal that this new statutory inter-
pretation was a major change in the law that judicially en-
larged the statute.97 Prior to this case, appellate courts had 
always read a viability requirement into California's feticide 
statute.98 Thus, the court could not apply this new interpreta-
tion to Robert Davis because it would violate his due process 
rights.99 To hold a defendant criminally responsible for con-
duct that he could not reasonably anticipate would be pro-
scribed would violate due process principles: "[T]he law must 
give sufficient warning that individuals 'may conduct them-
selves so as to avoid that which is forbidden.,,,loo Accordingly, 
the Davis court concluded that its new interpretation of 
clearly aware that it could have limited the term 'fetus' to 'viable fetus,' for it spe-
cifically rejected a proposed amendment that required the fetus be at least 20 
weeks in gestation before the statute would apply." [d. at 594. 
95. [d. at 599 (quoting SWANE-DORLAND ANN. MEDICAL-LEGAL DICT. 281 
(1987». 
96. Davis, 872 P.2d at 599. The court's holding overruled Smith and its proge-
ny. See supra notes 17-27 for a discussion those cases. 
97. Davis, 872 P.2d at 600. 
98. [d. See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text for a historical discussion 
of these cases. 
99. Davis, 872 P.2d at 600. The court explained that prior appellate court 
holdings demonstrated that a viability requirement had been consistently read into 
§ 187(a). [d. Consequently, the elimination of this requirement created an 
unforeseeable enlargement of a criminal statute. [d. Thus, the new interpretation 
of the statute should apply prospectively only. [d. The Davis court also noted that 
in this case it was not faced with reevaluating its own precedent. [d. 
100. [d. (quoting Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975». 
14
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California's feticide statute should apply only prospectively.101 
Because it could not administer its new interpretation of 
Penal Code section 187(a), to Robert Davis, the supreme court 
was forced to use the former interpretation of the statute;102 
yet, the trial court had given the jury a modified version of the 
former instruction. lOS Thus, the Davis court first had to con-
sider whether the trial court erred in giving the modified jury 
instruction, and if so, whether the error prejudiced Robert Da-
vis.104 
Because the trial court's instruction permitted the jury to 
convict Robert Davis of fetal murder if the fetus merely had a 
"possibility" of survival, rather than the formerly proper stan-
dard requiring that the fetus have a "probability" of survival, 
the Davis court found that the trial court erred in instructing 
the jury.105 Moreover, the court explained, the error preju-
diced Robert Davis. By substantially lowering the viability 
threshold as commonly understood and accepted, the instruc-
tion allowed the jury to find viability at an incorrect stage of 
fetal development.106 The court explained: "Had the jury been 
given [the proper instruction at the time], it is reasonably 
probable it would have found the fetus not viable."107 Thus, 
the Davis court concluded, Robert Davis' conviction must be 
101. [d. at 600. 
102. See id. at 601. 
103. See id. 
104. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 601. 
105. See id. The court observed: 
[d. at 602. 
106. [d. 
[T]he wording of CAWIC No. 8.10, defining viability as 
"normally capable of living outside the uterus," while not 
a model of clarity, suggests a better than even chance-a 
probability-that a fetus will survive if born at that par-
ticular point in time. By contrast, the instruction given 
below suggests a "possibility" of survival, and essentially 
amounts to a finding that a fetus incapable of survival 
outside the womb for any discernible time would nonethe-
less be considered "viable" within the meaning of section 
187, subdivision (a). 
107. Davis, 872 P.2d at 602. Davis' medical expert stated that it was "possible" 
for the fetus to have survived, but that the chances were 2 or 3 percent. [d. None 
of the medical experts who testified at the trial believed the fetus had a probable 
chance of survival. [d. 
15
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reversed, and the case must be remanded for a new tria1.108 
V. CONCURRENCE 
Justice Kennard agreed with the Davis majorityl09 that 
the legislature did not intend to make viability an element of 
fetal murder. no Additionally, Justice Kennard agreed that 
the United States Constitution does not prohibit a state from 
criminalizing the unlawful killing of a nonviable fetus. 111 
Nevertheless, she wrote separately to address the dissent and 
to expand on the majority's discussion of Roe v. Wade. ll2 
A. LEGISLATIVE INACTION IN THE FACE OF A JUDICIALLY 
IMPOSED VIABILITY REQUIREMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
ACQUIESCENCE 
Contrary to the dissent,113 Justice Kennard believed that 
there was no significance to the legislature's failure to rewrite 
the fetal murder statute in response to the appellate court 
decisions interpreting a viability element in the statute. U4 
Thus, she did not share the dissent's view that this legislative 
inaction implied an agreement with these decisions.ll5 
Justice Kennard pointed out that legislative inaction 
would only be significant if the legislature could have nullified 
the rule adopted by the courts of appeal; here, however, the 
legislature was powerless to eliminate the requirement of fetal 
viability even had it so desired.u6 Justice Kennard reasoned 
that the legislature's restraint stemmed from previous appel-
late court decisions that interpreted the viability requirement 
for fetal murder as a matter of constitutional law. 117 
108. ld. 
109. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994) (per Kennard, J., concurring, 
joined by Stone, J.). 
110. See id. at 603 
111. See id. 
112. See id. 
113. See id. at 607·24 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See infra notes 135·97 and ac· 
companying text for the author's discussion of Justice Mosk's dissent. 
114. Davis, 872 P.2d at 603. 
115. ld. 
116. ld. 
117. ld. Justice Kennard explained: "Faced with that appellate authority, the 
16
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B. THE STATE'S POWER TO CRIMINALIZE THE KILLING OF A 
FETUS DOES NOT DEPEND ON FETAL VIABILITY 
Justice Kennard stated that prior appellate court decisions 
had erroneously relied on Roe v. Wade1l8 when they read a 
viability requirement into the fetal murder statute.1l9 She be-
lieved that these courts had confused the issue of state author-
ity to interfere with a woman's right to choose an abortion, 
with the state's interest in punishing a third party whose con-
duct deprives a woman of her right to choose.12o Justice 
Kennard explained: " [W]hen, as here, a violent assault on a 
pregnant woman results in the killing of the fetus she carries, 
the state's power to criminalize the act as murder does not 
depend on 'fetal viability."H21 
C. IN SOME INSTANCES THE NEW STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
COULD RESULT IN CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PuNISHMENT 
Although Justice Kennard joined the majority's conclusion 
that fetal viability is not necessary to convict a defendant of 
fetal murder, she believed the dissent raised a significant con-
cern regarding the death penalty issue.122 Justice Kennard 
legislature's inaction proves nothing more than its recognition that, under Califor-
nia case law, enforcement of section 187, subdivision (a), against someone who had 
killed a nonviable fetus would be unconstitutional." [d. 
118. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
119. Davis, 872 P.2d at 603. 
120. [d. Justice Kennard stated: 
Although in Roe the concept of "fetal viability" was criti-
cal to the first of the two issues, it has no application to 
California's fetal murder statute . . . Because, unlike the 
situation in Roe v. Wade . . . there is no competing con-
stitutionally protected interest at stake, the state's deci-
sion to criminalize the conduct can be justified even if the 
state does not have a compelling interest in protecting 
potential human life. 
[d. at 603-04. 
121. [d. at 604. Justice Kennard added: "[W]hen a fetus dies as the result of a 
criminal assault on a pregnant woman, the state's interest extends beyond the 
protection of potential human life. The state has an interest in punishing violent 
conduct that deprives a pregnant woman of her procreative choice." [d. 
122. [d. at 604. See also id. at 615-20 for dissent's discussion regarding the pos-
sibly unconstitutional circumstances. See infra notes 171-84 and accompanying text 
for the author's summary of Justice Mosk's discussion on this issue. 
17
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agreed with the dissent that the majority's new interpretation 
of California's murder statute could potentially result in viola-
tions of the constitutional proscriptions against cruel and un-
usual punishment.123 She pointed out that under California's 
felony-murder rule,124 this new· interpretation could lead to 
the imposition of the death penalty even if a convicted 
defendant's conduct is inadvertent.125 
In Robert Davis' situation, however, Justice Kennard felt 
that the trial court's sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole was not wholly disproportionate to his 
criminal culpability.126 Nevertheless, she agreed with the ma-
jority that reversal of Davis' conviction was necessary to pre-
serve his due process rights. 127 
123. Davis. 872 P.2d at 604. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII stating: "[e)xcessive 
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted." 
[d. 
124. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (a) (West Supp. 1995). 
125. [d. at 604. Justice Kennard explained: 
Under [the felony-murder) rule, even an accidental killing 
committed during the perpetration of certain specifies felo-
nies is first degree murder . . . . In some such cases a 
penalty of death, or even life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole, may be wholly disproportionate to 
the particular defendant's criminal culpability, and thus 
may violate constitutional proscriptions against cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
In his dissent, Justice Mosk explained: 
[A)n unarmed 18-year-old with no criminal record enters a 
store during business hours, intending to shoplift a can of 
spray paint; when a security guard accosts him, his nerve 
fails and he bolts for the door; in his haste he accidental-
ly knocks a woman shopper to the floor; unknown to 
anyone the woman is 7 weeks' pregnant, and the trauma 
of the fall causes her to miscarry. 
[d. at 619. See infra notes 171-84 and accompanying text for the discussion of 
Justice Mosk's dissent. 
126. Davis, 872 P.2d at 604. Justice Kennard argued that life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole was not disproportionate to Davis' criminal culpa-
bility because Davis had shot his victim in the chest at point blank range as he 
attempted to rob her. [d. This conduct was highly likely to result in a fatality. [d. 
It was only fortuitous that Davis' conduct did not result in the victim's death in 
addition to the death of her fetus. [d. 
127. [d. at 603. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text for a summary 
of the Davis majority's discussion of due process principles. 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss3/5
1995] CALIFORNIA'S FETAL MURDER STATUTE 597 
VI. CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT 
Justice Baxter wrote a concurring and dissenting opin-
ion.12s Although he agreed with the majority's construction of 
California's feticide statute, Justice Baxter believed Robert 
Davis' conviction should not have been reversed.129 Specifical-
ly, Justice Baxter disagreed with the majority's conclusion that 
the jury instruction regarding fetal viability created an 
unforeseeable judicial enlargement of the feticide statute that 
would have violated Davis' due process rights. 130 
Justice Baxter asserted three principal reasons in support 
of his assertion that the trial court's instruction did not 
unforeseeably enlarge the fetal murder statute. 131 He be-
lieved these reasons demonstrated that the definition of viabili-
ty before this case was an open question in California. 132 
Thus, Justice Baxter urged, Robert Davis was put on adequate 
notice that the state would proscribe his conduct; he could not 
credibly claim that the trial court's jury instruction 
128. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 604-07 (Cal. 1994) (per Baxter, J., concur-
ring and dissenting, joined by George, J.). 
129. [d. at 604-05 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting). Baxter noted: 
[d. at 604. 
Had the trial court in this case given an instruction that 
a fetus need not be viable under Penal Code section 187, 
subdivision (a), or had the law in California been settled 
that, for purposes of section 187(a), a viable fetus meant 
a fetus with a "probability" or "reasonable likelihood" of 
survival outside the womb, then I would not hesitate in 
joining the lead opinion to reverse defendant's conviction. 
130. [d. at 605. Justice Baxter noted: "In finding that this definitional instruc-
tion was in error, the lead opinion is purporting to decide an issue that was un-
settled both at the time defendant acted and at the time of his trial . . . . In ef-
fect, the lead opinion wanders into a wonderland to decide what the law might be 
had it not been for today's holding rejecting the viability limitation." [d. 
131. See ill. First, at the time of defendant's actions, no court had directly ad-
dressed whether a viable fetus means a fetus with a possible or probable chance 
of survival outside the womb. [d. Second, two courts had already expressed the 
view that a viable fetus means one with a possibility of survival outside the 
womb. [d. (emphasis added). Third, the California Supreme Court indicated it 
would consider the suitability of an instruction implying a fetus is deemed viable 
when it had a possibility of survival if and when it was faced with a case involv-
ing the viability of a fetus with less than a 50% chance of survival. [d. Thus, 
Justice Baxter concluded, the definition of viability was an open ended question at 
the time Robert Davis acted. [d. 
132. [d. 
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unforeseeably enlarged the fetal murder statute. 133 Accord-
ingly, Justice Baxter concluded, application of the jury instruc-
tion to Robert Davis would not have abridged his due process 
rights. 134 
VII. DISSENT 
Justice Mosk was the sole dissenter from the majority's 
holding that fetal viability is not required to convict a defen-
dant of fetal murder. Justice Mosk wrote a lengthy dissent 
basing his position on five separate grounds. 135 
A. THE PuRPOSE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IS TO 
AsCERTAIN LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
Justice Mosk began his dissent by stating that both a 
statute's legislative history and the wider circumstances of its 
enactment demonstrate relevant evidence of a legislature's 
actual intent. l36 He explained that the legislative intent be-
hind the amendment· of section 187(a) could be ascertained 
only by understanding the defendant's actions in Keeler v. 
Superior Court137 and the supreme court's response to 
them.13s Justice Mosk added: "It is black letter law that the 
holding of a case is determined 'by taking into account ... the 
facts treated by the judge as material, and. . . his decision 
based on them.",139 Justice Mosk then pointed out that he 
had authored the Keeler opinion for the court.14D 
In Keeler, the defendant had intentionally killed his es-
tranged wife's viable fetus, yet, he was acquitted of murder 
133. [d. at 607. 
134. Davis, 872 P.2d at 607. 
135. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 607-24 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
136. [d. at 607. 
137. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970). 
138. Davis, 872 P.2d at 608. Section 187(a) was amended immediately following 
the Keeler decision in response to the legislature's outrage at that opinion. [d. 
Thus, the Keeler holding sheds light on the legislature's intent behind the amend-
ment. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of Keeler. 
139. Davis, 872 P.2d at 608 (citing Achen v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 233 P.2d 
74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951)). 
140. [d. 
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because California's murder statute did not refer to fetus-
es. l4l In affirming the trial court, the supreme court ex-
plained that the common law had always required a live birth 
to support a charge of murder.142 
The issue before the Keeler court, Justice Mosk asserted, 
was "whether an unborn but viable fetus is a 'human being' 
within the meaning of section 187."143 Justice Mosk placed 
great importance on the fact that the fetus in Keeler was viable 
because the majority in that case repeatedly incorporated that 
fact into its legal analysis and conclusions.144 Although the 
Keeler court did not deny that a fetus capable of independent 
existence was viable, the court still held that the defendant 
could not be prosecuted for the murder of an unborn, but via-
ble fetus. 146 The court did not want to expand the murder 
statute to an additional class of victims, reasoning that the 
task was solely reserved to the legislature.146 Furthermore, 
the Keeler court noted, such an interpretation of the statute 
would result in a judicial enlargement that would violate the 
defendant's due process rights for lack of notice. 147 
Justice Mosk additionally stressed that the dissent in Keel-
er ''likewise tied its analysis and conclusions closely to the fact 
of viability."148 Because the dissent argued that "[t]here is no 
141. See Keeler, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970). 
142. Davis, 872 P.2d at 609 (citing Keeler, 470 P.2d at 620). 
143. [d. (citing Keeler, 470 P.2d at 618) (emphasis added). The Keeler court 
stressed that, at the time of the stillborn delivery, the fetus was approximately 34 
112 to 36 weeks old, and the medical expert concluded with reasonable certainty 
that the fetus was viable. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 619. 
144. Davis, 872 P.2d at 608. 
145. [d. at 618. 
146. [d. The Keeler court reasoned: "For a court simply to declare, by judicial 
fiat, that the time has now come to prosecute under section 187 one who kills an 
unborn but viable fetus would indeed be to rewrite the statute under the guise of 
construing it." [d. at 625-26. 
147. Davis, 872 P.2d at 609 (citing Keeler, 470 P.2d at 630). The Keeler court 
noted that it did not find any existing California case which would have given 
defendant notice that the killing of an unborn, viable fetus was covered by § 
187(a). Keeler, 470 P.2d at 630. 
148. Davis, 872 P.2d at 609. In his dissenting opinion in Keeler, Acting Chief 
Justice Burke continuously argued that a viable fetus should be considered a 
human being, and therefore, included within California's murder statute. Keeler, 
470 P.2d. at 630. He asserted that there is common law precedent to support the 
view that a viable fetus is a human being under § 187. [d. To illustrate this 
point, Justice Burke explained that the common law severely punished abortion 
21
Qureshi: California's Fetal Murder Statute
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995
600 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:579 
good reason why a fully viable fetus should not be considered a 
'human being' under [section 187]."149 Justice Mosk believed 
it was "obvious" that the Keeler decision held that the legisla-
ture did not intend the killing of an "unborn, but viable" fetus 
to constitute murder under section 187(a).150 According to 
Justice Mosk, in rushing to amend s~ction 187(a), "the Legis-
lature extended the crime of murder, as the Keeler court re-
fused to do, to the malicious killing of a viable fetus. "151 He 
opined: "[T]o read that amendment as further extending mur-
der to include the killing of even a nonviable fetus, as the lead 
opinion does now, is to ignore the facts and holding of Keeler 
and the direct legislative response they so plainly trig-
gered."152 
B. EIGHTEEN YEARS OF LEGISLATIVE SILENCE SIGNAL PASSIVE 
,ApPROVAL OF THE FETAL VIABILITY REQUIREMENT 
As a second ground for his dissent, Justice Mosk explained 
that People v. Smith,l53 the first case to construe the 1970 
amendment to section 187, and all subsequent cases involving 
fetal murder in California, have "held or assumed that viability 
is an element of the crime."154 
Moreover, Justice Mosk pointed out, since Smith, the legis-
lature had met eighteen times without taking any steps to 
overrule the holding of that case. 155 According to Justice 
after "quickening" and reasoned that, "we cannot assume that the legislature in-
tended a person such as defendant, charged with the malicious slaying of a fully 
viable child, to suffer only the mild penalties imposed upon common abortionists 
who, ordinarily, procure only the miscarriage of a nonviable fetus or embryo." [d. 
at 631 (emphasis added). Justice Burke further argued that his view "would not 
judicially create a new offense because the Legislature intended that the term 
'human being' in section 187 be constituted as an evolving concept defined by the 
courts according to contemporary conditions." [d. at 632. 




153. 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Ct. App. 1976). 
154. Davis, 872 P.2d at 610-11. Justice Mosk referred to People v. Hamilton, 
774 P.2d 730 (Cal. 1989); People v. Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1990); 
People v. R.P. Smith, 234 Cal. Rptr. 142 (Ct. App. 1987); and People v. Apodaca, 
142 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Ct. App. 1978). 
155. Davis, 872 P.2d at 611. Justice Mosk recognized that Legislative silence 
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Mosk, if the California Legislature had disagreed with later 
judicial opinions limiting criminal liability for the killing of a 
fetus to a viable fetus, it would have responded as vigorously 
as it had after the Keeler u. Superior Court decision in 1970 by 
once again amending the statute.15S However, rather than 
taking remedial action, the legislature has remained silent.167 
Thus, Justice Mosk concluded: "In these circumstances [the 
legislature's] acquiescence is persuasive evidence of its in-
tent."158 
C. THE MAJORITY EXAGGERATES THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
By ASSERTING THAT THE TERM "FETUS" WAS 
DELIBERATELY LEFT UNDEFINED 
Justice Mosk next noted that the majority opinion devoted 
barely any of its discussion to the task of determining the 
legislature's intent when it amended California's homicide 
statute to include fetal murder.159 He asserted that the ma-
jority opinion made a "gross exaggeration" of the legislative 
history by concluding that the legislature deliberately declined 
to adopt a provision that limited the section 187(a) amendment 
after a court has construed a statute gives rise at most to an arguable inference 
of acquiescence or passive approval and that the presumption of such acquiescence 
is not conclusive in determining legislative intent. [d. at 612 (citing Harris v. 
Capital Growth Investors, 805 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1991)). Nevertheless, Mosk argued 
that, because the viability element of fetal murder had been recognized in a num-
ber of published opinions, approved jury instructions, and the legislature has ac-
quiesced in that construction for 18 years, the inference of passive legislative ap-
proval was quite strong. [d. 
156. Davis, 872 P.2d at 612. Mosk noted that the legislature is aware of its 
power to delete added statutory elements by judicial construction. [d. at 611. To 
demonstrate his point, Justice Mosk stated that in People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911 
(Cal. 1966), the California Supreme Court declared that, "[aln awareness of the 
obligation to act within a general body of laws regulating society . . . is included 
in the statutory definition of ... malice." [d. (citing Conley, 411 P.2d 911 (Cal. 
1966». In 1981, however, the legislature expressly repudiated the Conley construc-
tion by adding a sentence to the applicable section 188 declaring: "An awareness 
of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society is not 
included within the definition of malice." Davis, 872 P.2d at 612 (quoting Stats. 
1981, ch. 404, § 6, p.1593). 
157. [d. 
158. [d. See supra notes 113-17 for Justice Kennard's response to this argu-
ment. 
159. Davis, 872 P.2d at 612. Justice Mosk asserted that the majority essentially 
gave up on the task of determining legislature's intent. ld. 
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to viable fetuses. l60 
Justice Mosk further argued that the majority had com-
pletely misread the legislative history when it asserted that 
the legislature was "clearly aware that it could have limited 
the term 'fetus' to 'viable fetus,' for it specifically rejected a 
proposed amendment that required the fetus to be at least 
twenty weeks in gestation before the statute would apply."16l 
Contrary to the majority's assertion, according to Justice Mosk, 
the proposed amendment that would protect a twenty-week-old 
fetus as a human being was deleted to avoid conflict with the 
Therapeutic Abortion Act,162 not because of the viability is-
sue.163 
Furthermore, Justice Mosk stated that the majority opin-
ion erred by defining fetal murder liability at "seven or eight 
weeks after fertilization."l64 Justice Mosk believed the majori-
ty was legislating on the subject and that such an imprecise in-
terpretation was highly unlikely the legislature's intent. 165 
160. Davis, 872 P.2d at 613. Justice Mosk quoted the majority as concluding: 
"The legislative history of the amendment suggests the term 'fetus' was deliber-
ately left undefined after Legislature debated whether to limit the scope of statu-
tory application to viable fetus." 1d. (quoting Davis, 872 P.2d at 594). 
Justice Mosk believed this statement wrongfully implied that the legislature 
conducted a full debate on whether the section 187 amendment should be limited 
to viable fetuses. 1d. In addition, Justice Mosk pointed out, the majority's support 
for this conclusion consisted of only one committee member who argued that the 
amendment should be expressly limited to viable fetuses. 1d. Justice Mosk argued 
that this single objection was merely the personal position of one person and was 
a far cry from a full scale legislative debate. Id. He concluded that it was not a 
proper subject for determining the legislature's intent because it did not represent 
the views of other legislative members who favored the bill. 1d. 
161. 1d. 
162. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-25957 (West 1984 & Supp. 
1995). 
163. Davis, 872 P.2d at 613. Justice Mosk stated that the language in the origi-
nal version of the 1970 amendment, which states: "As used in this section, 'human 
being' includes a fetus which has advanced to or beyond the 20th week of 
uterogestation," had nothing to do with viability, but referred to abortion and 
"quickening." 1d. Justice Mosk based his opinion on the undisputed medical fact 
that fetuses are not viable at 20 weeks. Id. 
164. Id. at 614. Specifically, the majority opinion concluded that the malicious 
killing of a fetus under California Penal Code § 187 is murder so long as the 
state can show that the fetus has progressed beyond the seven or eight week 
embryonic stage. Id. (citing Davis, 872 P.2d at 602). 
165. Davis, 872 P.2d at 614. Justice Mosk explained that the legislature would 
never draw a line at seven or eight weeks. 1d. He analogized this Legislative im-
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He explained that a seven-week-old fetus is the size of a pea-
nut and argued that the contrast between it and a viable fetus 
is too obvious to be ignored.166 Justice Mosk could believe 
that the legislature intended the killing of a fully viable fetus 
to constitute murder, yet, he could not believe the legislature 
intended the definition of murder to include the killing of "an 
object the size of a peanut. "167 
D. WHEN THERE Is UNCERTAINTY ABOUT STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION, IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THE 
LEGISLATURE INTENDED REASONABLE RESULTS, NOT 
ABSURD CONSEQUENCES 
Justice Mosk argued that it was even more improbable 
that the legislature intended many of the consequences result-
ing from the majority's new definition of "fetus" in Penal Code 
section 1.87(a).168 One consequence, Justice Mosk explained, is 
that a defendant can be convicted of capital murder for causing 
the death of an object that no person had any reason to know 
even existed.169 Even in the present case, Justice Mosk em-
phasized, existing evidence suggested that Robert Davis did 
not know his victim was pregnant when he robbed and shot 
her. 170 
preciseness to scenario of the legislature prescribing that the death penalty shall 
not be imposed on any individual under the age of 17 or 18. [d. 
166. [d. at 615. 
167. [d. Justice Mosk described a seven week embryo as having a bulbous head 
that comprises roughly half of its body, widely spread eye sockets and puglike nos-
trils. [d. at 614-15. Additionally, the embryo's hands and feet are still webbed and 
it retains a vestigial tail. [d. at 615. Justice Mosk noted that if viewed at eight 
weeks, an uninformed observer would have difficulty even recognizing it as human. 
[d. 
168. [d. 
169. [d. Mosk stated: 
[d. 
A woman whose reproductive system contains an imma-
ture fetus a fraction of an inch long and weighing a frac-
tion of an ounce does not, of course, appear pregnant. In 
fact, if she is one of many women with some irregularity 
in her menstrual cycle, she herself may not know she is 
pregnant . . .. Unless such a woman knows she is preg-
nant and has disclosed that fact to the defendant, the 
defendant has no way of knowing she is carrying a fetus. 
170. Davis, 872 P.2d at 615. Robert Davis testified that, on the day of the 
shooting, his victim, Maria Flores, did not "show" her pregnancy. [d. She was 
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Justice Mosk further charged that the majority's new in-
terpretation of the state's murder statute creates absurd conse-
quences due to its interaction with California's felony-murder 
statute.171 In the present case, lacking proof of both malice 
and premeditation, the prosecutor sought a murder conviction 
on the theory of felony-murder. 172 Justice Mosk pointed out 
that the felony-murder theory had been invoked in only one 
previous fetal murder case that did not involve the intentional 
killing of a fetus. 173 Nevertheless, Justice Mosk explained, 
even that case was distinguishable from the present scenar-
io. 174 
In People v. Henderson,175 the prosecutor likewise in-
voked the theory of felony-murder in an attempt to convict the 
defendant of murder. 176 However, contrary to the Davis sce-
nario, at the time of fetal death in Henderson, the victim's 
fetus was viable, for the mother was approximately thirty 
weeks pregnant.177 Moreover, the jury in Henderson avoided 
the severe results of the felony-murder rule by exercising its 
"power of nullification"178 to convict the defendant of second 
degree murder rather than the requisite first degree murder.179 
approximately five feet and weighed 191 pounds on the last day of her visit to her 
obstetrician. [d. Furthermore, a doctor at Davis' trial testified that it was not 
likely that, given Flores' height and weight, she would have showed her pregnancy 
while clothed and standing up. [d. 
171. [d. at 616. 
172. Davis, 872 P.2d at 617. 
173. [d. In People v. Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1990), the felony 
murder rule was invoked by the prosecutor, but the facts differ. See infra notes 
175-79 and accompanying text. 
174. Davis, 872 P.2d at 617. 
175. 275 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1990). In Henderson, the defendant robbed 
and killed a married couple. [d. at 839. At the time of the murder, the wife was 
pregnant with a viable 'cetus. [d. at 841. 
176. [d. at 839. 
177. [d. at 841. Furthermore, the defendant in Henderson was well acquainted 
with the pregnant woman because he lived with her prior to murdering her and 
her fetus. [d. at 842. 
178. See generally People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 728 (Cal. 1983) (Kaus, J., 
concurring), for an explanation of jury nullification. Jury nullification occurs when 
the jury ignores a rule or result that it considers unjust. 1d. 
179. See Davis 872 P. 2d. at 617 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (saying that the jury 
apparently exercised their "power of nullification" by finding defendant Philip 
Henderson guilty of only second degree murder of the victim's fetus). But see 
Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr.· at 839, where the jury found the defendant Velma 
Henderson guilty of murder in the first degree of the same fetus. See also CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1995). Under the felony-murder rule, a murder 
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Justice Mosk asserted that the majority's new definition of 
"fetus" in section 187 will create even harsher results than in 
Henderson. 18o He explained that the felony-murder rule "will 
be extended to include any death, in the commission of a listed 
felony, of a nonviable and invisible fetus that the actor neither 
knew nor had reason to know existed."181 Justice Mosk be-
lieved it unlikely that the legislature intended the 1970 
amendment to section 187(a), to accomplish "so absurd a re-
sult. "182 Furthermore, he added, these unsound results could 
provoke either juries to nullify convictions,183 or courts to 
hold that a first degree murder conviction violates the Eighth 
committed during an enumerated felony is murder in the first degree as a matter 
of law. 
In Henderson, the defendant, Philip Henderson, was convicted of robbery 
and two counts of first degree murder for the deaths of the married couple, but 
the jury only convicted him of second degree murder for the death of the fetus. 
Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 839. In Justice Mosk's opinion, the Henderson jury 
was doubtlessly instructed that under the felony-murder rule, the killing of the 
fetus was first degree murder because it occurred during a robbery. Davis, 872 
P.2d at 617 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, Justice Mosk stated that the jury 
declined to follow the law given to them by the court and instead, returned a 
verdict of second degree murder, thus, exercising their power of nullification. [d. 
180. Davis, 872 P.2d at 617. 
181. [d. at 619. Justice Mosk charged that excluding the viability element in 
section 187(a) will provide draconian results in felony-murder situations. [d. at 
618. In his opinion, the Davis decision would apply to the scenario where: 
lAIn unarmed 18-year-old with no criminal record enters a 
store during business hours, intending to shoplift a can of 
spray paint; when a security guard accosts him, his nerve 
fails and he bolts for the door; in his haste he accidental-
ly knocks a woman shopper to the floor; unknown to 
anyone the woman is 7 weeks' pregnant, and the trauma 
of the fall causes her to miscarry. 
[d. at 619. Justice Mosk explained, that prior to the majority's new interpretation, 
such a youth would be guilty at most of second degree burglary, punishable by a 
prison term up to three years. [d. Now, this teenager could be found guilty of first 
degree murder of a fetus on a burglary felony-murder theory. [d. In that event, 
his punishment would be at least 25 years to life in prison, and he could be sen-
tenced to death. [d. 
182. [d. Justice Mosk stated that, to apply felony murder to the unintentional 
death of a nonviable and invisible fetus that an individual did not know existed 
extends the rule beyond the purpose it was intended to serve. [d. He cited former 
California Justice Traynor, in People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965), as 
stating: "The felony-murder rule has been criticized on the grounds that in almost 
all cases in which it is applied it is unnecessary and that it erodes the relation 
between criminal liability and moral culpability. Although it is the law in this 
state, it should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to 
serve." [d. (quoting Washington, 402 P.2d at 134) (citations omitted). 
183. [d. at 620. See supra note 178 for a discussion of jury nullification. 
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Amendment. 184 
E. THE MAJORITY'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE 1970 AMENDMENT 
TO PENAL CODE SECTION 187(A) WILL MAKE CALIFORNIA'S 
MURDER STATUTE THE MOST SEVERE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Lastly, Justice Mosk declared, in most states, the killing of 
a fetus is not homicide.186 In fact, Mosk asserted, "it appears 
that in no other state is it a capital offense to cause the death 
of a nonviable and invisible fetus that the actor neither knew 
nor had reason to know existed. "186 
Justice Mosk's personal research discovered various juris-
dictions that have enacted stattites criminalizing the killing of 
a fetus, and he grouped these jurisdictions into three distinct 
categories. First, in at least thirteen jurisdictions, the killing 
of a fetus is not criminal unless the fetus is viable or is far be-
yond the gestational age of seven or eight weeks, the period 
prescribed by the majority opinion.187 Second, in at least six 
184. [d. See People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1983) (holding, on the facts of 
that case, that a sentence of life imprisonment for a seventeen year old youth, 
who was convicted of first degree felony murder, for killing a marijuana farmer, 
was cruel and unusual punishment). 
185. Davis, 872 P.2d at 620. 
186. [d. 
187. [d. at 621. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §707.7 (West 1993) (fetal killing 
after the second trimester is called "feticide"); N.Y. PENAL §125.00 (McKinney 
1987) (homicide exists when the fetus is older than 24 weeks). In South Carolina 
fetal murder exists when the fetus is viable. See State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703, 
704 (S.C. 1984) (holding that fetal murder exists when the fetus is viable); See 
Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571, 575-76 (Mass. 1989) (holding that a 
defendant can be convicted for the common law crime of murder where the fetus 
was viable, but has not addressed the issue of whether such viability is a prereq-
uisite to culpability). In England, a statute provides that any person who inten-
tionally causes a fetal death commits the crime of "child destruction" provided that 
the fetus was capable of being born alive. Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 1929, 19 
& 20 Geo. 5, ch. 34 § 1. 
In eight of these thirteen states the relevant statutes criminalize the killing 
of an "unborn quick child." See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 1992); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-5-80 (1992); MICH. COMPo LAwS ANN. § 750.322 (West 1991); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.210 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
TIT. 21, § 713 (WEST 1983); R.1. GEN LAws ANN. § 11-23-5 (1994); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (West 1988). Justice Mosk noted that in all but one of 
these eight states, fetal homicide is punished as "manslaughter"; in Georgia, he ex-
plained, it is deemed "feticide." Davis, 872 P.2d at 621. 
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jurisdictions, the legislature has expressly declared that the 
killing of a product of conception is criminal regardless of its 
gestational age. 188 Finally, in at least six jurisdictions, the 
statute is facially silent on the matter of minimum gestational 
age for a conviction of fetal murder.189 
Justice Mosk pointed out that California is one of these six 
states within the third category. In the other five states, how-
ever, the punishment for the offense is far less harsh than 
California. l90 Even in Utah, where the state murder statute 
188. [d. at 621-22. See ARIZ. REV. STAT ANN. § 13-1103 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-13-201 (Michie 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7 (Michie 1994). 
Contrary to the three states where the killing of a product of conception is 
not murder, Justice Mosk stated that in Illinois, the offense is called "intentional 
homicide of an unborn child." See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/9-1.2 (Smith-
Hurd 1993). "But the statute further provides that the act is not homicide unless 
the actor actually 'knew that the woman was pregnant .... [d. at subd. (a)(3). "And 
the punishment for this crime 'shall be the same as for first degree murder, except 
that the death penalty may not be imposed .... [d. at subd. (d) (emphasis added). 
Minnesota and North Dakota label the offense as the "murder of an unborn child." 
See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266, 609.2661 (West 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
17.1-01, 12.1-17.1-02 (Supp. 1993). In Minnesota the offense is first degree murder 
if the actor kills the unborn child either with premeditation and "with intent to 
effect the death of the unborn child or another," or while committing a listed 
felony; however, the maximum punishment is life imprisonment. MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 609.2661. In North Dakota the maximum penalty is life imprisonment. See N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 (1985). 
189. Davis, 872 P.2d at 623. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 187(a) (West 1988); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Burns 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.6 (West 
Supp. 1990); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 631:1 (Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAws 
ANN. § 22-17-6 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201(1) (1990). 
190. Davis, 872 P.2d at 623. Justice Mosk explained that in four of these five 
states, the killing of a fetus is given special treatment and not punished as se-
verely as in California. He stated: 
Thus, in Indiana one who "knowingly or intentionally" 
terminates a pregnancy commits feticide, punishable by 
imprisonment for four years with a possible fine of not 
more than $10,000. In Louisiana one who kills an unborn 
child intentionally or in the commission of a listed felony 
commits first degree feticide punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than 15 years. In South Dakota one who 
"intentionally kills a human fetus by causing an injury to 
its mother" commits a felony punishable by imprisonment 
for 10 years with a possible fine of $10,000. And in New 
Hampshire one who "Purposely or knowingly causes injury 
to another resulting in miscarriage or stillbirth" commits 
first degree assault punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than 15 years with a possible fine not to exceed 
$4,000. 
[d. (citations omitted). See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-1-6, 35-50-2-6 (Burns 1994); 
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most closely resembles California's, the murder of a fetus is 
considered a capital offense "only if the actor caused the death 
of the unborn child 'intentionally or knowingly,' even in a felo-
ny-murder case."191 Justice Mosk maintained that it was 
highly unlikely that the legislature intended to make 
California's murder statute the most severe in the United 
States. 192 
F. REMAND FOR A NEW TRIAL WOULD BE FuTILE 
Justice Mosk concluded his dissent by arguing that a retri-
al on the murder count would be a "total waste of court time, 
prosecutorial resources and taxpayers' money. "193 He ex-
plained that, if a retrial occurred, the prosecution would be 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Flores' fetus 
was viable and that survival was probable rather than possi-
ble.194 Justice Mosk believed that this task would be futile 
because "none of the medical experts who testified at [Robert 
Davis'] trial believed that the fetus had a 'probable' chance of 
survival. "195 He asserted that the prosecution had taken "its 
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.6 (West Supp. 1990); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 631:1, 
subd. I(c), 651:2 (Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 22·17-6, 22-6-1 (1988). 




(a) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentional-
ly, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or 
acting with a mental state otherwise specified in the 
statute defining the offense, causes the death of another 
human being, including an unborn child. 
(b) There shall be no cause of action for criminal homi-
cide against a mother or a physician for the death of an 
unborn child caused by an abortion. 
192. Davis, 872 P.2d at 623. Justice Mosk stated: 
I cannot believe that in amending section 187 to make 
that act a crime the Legislature also intended to make 
California the only state in the Union in which it is a 
capital offense to cause the death of a nonviable and 
invisible fetus that the actor neither knew nor had reason 
to know existed. Yet this, again, is where the lead 
opinion's construction of the 1970 amendment inexorably 
takes us. I dissent from that construction. 
193. [d. at 624. 
194. Davis, 872 P.2d at 624. The prosecution would have to prove that the 
fetuB had greater than a 50% chance of survival outside the mother's womb. [d. 
195. [d. (quoting Davis, 872 P.2d at 602). The prosecution called three physi-
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best shot" at proving viability beyond a reasonable doubt, but 
could not successfully do SO.196 Thus, Justice Mosk opined, it 
would be highly improbable that the prosecution could estab-
lish a better case for viability in a retrial, "let alone prove that 
element beyond a reasonable doubt."197 
VIII. CRITIQUE 
A. THE LEGISLATURE ONLY INTENDED VIABLE FETUSES TO BE 
COVERED BY ITS 1970 AMENDMENT 
The author agrees with the dissent that the legislature did 
not deliberately intend to exclude the term "viable" from the 
1970 amendment of California Penal Code section 187(a).198 
The Davis majority failed to offer any substantial evidence 
demonstrating the legislature's intent to purposely omit the 
term "viable" from the statute. Justice Mosk, to the contrary, 
correctly pointed out that the 1970 amendment to section 187 
was enacted in direct and emphatic response to the California 
Supreme Court's holding in Keeler v. Superior Court. 199 The 
legislature hastily amended the statute to express its outrage 
at a judicial opinion that permitted a man who intentionally 
killed the viable fetus of his former wife to escape criminal 
culpability.20o 
B. LEGISLATIVE SILENCE DOES NOTE SIGNAL ACQUIESCENCE 
In his dissent, Justice Mosk demonstrated that the 
legislature's initial intention was to include only viable fetuses 
within California's murder statute.201 Nevertheless, the au-
cians who were all experts in fetal viability and not a single physician believed 
that Flores' fetus "probably" would have survived outside its mother's womb. [d. 
196. [d. 
197. [d. Justice Mosk explained that the facts and medical testimony would not 
change in a retrial. [d. Thus, there would be no reason to compel the physicians 
to repeat their tedious testimony or to put the victim and her family through this 
tragic event once again. [d. 
198. See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 607-15, (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing). . 
199. See id. at 607-10. See Keeler, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970). 
200. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 610. See supra notes 137-52 and accompanying text 
for a summary of Justice Mosk's discussion regarding Keeler. 
201. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 607-10. 
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thor believes that Justice Mosk was mistaken in his assertion 
that the legislature acquiesced in eighteen years of appellate 
court holdings requiring viability for fetal murder because the 
legislature agreed with the interpretation of those courts.202 
Justice Kennard, in her concurrence, was correct in pointing 
out that the legislature was powerless to delete the judicially 
imposed viability requirement of section 187 due to the consti-
tutional mandate set by prior appellate court decisions.203 
Thus, the fact that the legislature had not responded to these 
subsequent appellate court rulings by once again amending the 
statute did not demonstrate its agreement with these courts' 
interpretations.204 Because the courts' relied on Roe v. Wade 
in imposing the viability requirement, whether or not the leg-
islature agreed with their holdings, its silence signaled nothing 
more that its acquiescence in those courts' interpretation of the 
United States Constitution.205 
Regardless of the correct statutory interpretation, now 
that the California Supreme Court has drawn its own conclu-
sion regarding the legislature's intent and ruled that viability 
is no longer a requirement for fetal murder, the court has 
provided the legislature the perfect opportunity to clarify its 
actual intent. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. California Should Enact a Separate Feticide Statute 
The California Legislature should enact a separate statute 
to punish the killing of a fetus. Separating feticide from homi-
cide would eliminate the turmoil that is caused by the cate-
gorization of both offenses within California's general murder 
statute.206 Most states do not criminalize the killing of a fetus 
in the same statute that criminalizes "homicide."207 Instead, 
202. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 603 (Kennard, J., concurring). 
203. See id. 
204. See id. 
205. See id. 
206. See Maura Dolan, Assault Causing Miscarriage Can Be Murder, L.A. 
TIMES, May 17, 1994, at AI. 
207. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 620 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Trudell, 
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these states statutorily distinguish between the two 
offenses.208 For example, in Indiana one who knowingly or 
intentionally terminates a pregnancy commits "feticide."209 
One who knowingly or intentionally kills another human be-
ing, by contrast, commits "murder.,,21o 
By criminalizing the killing of a fetus under a feticide 
statute rather than under a more general murder statute, the 
legislature would help diffuse the controversy that abortion 
activists have breathed into this issue.211 A separate feticide 
statute would recognize the perpetual state interest in protect-
ing the "potentiality of life" by permitting punishment of an 
actor who intentionally terminates a fetus.212 
2. Punishment Should Result Only Where Knowledge and 
Intent Are Present, Regardless of Fetal Viability 
Furthermore, the separate feticide statute should punish 
the intentional killing of a fetus regardless of viability. 
Criminals who knowingly and intentionally terminate a 
woman's fetus at any gestational age would be deemed to have 
committed feticide. They could face up to life imprisonment 
due to the state's interests in protecting the potentiality of life 
and punishing violent conduct that deprives a woman of her 
choice to have a child.213 In this same situation, however, the 
death penalty would be too harsh because the termination of a 
fetus is not the taking of a "human life.,,214 
3. The Felony-Murder Rule Should Not Apply 
Lastly, California's felony-murder rule215 would not apply 
755 P.2d 511, 515 (Kan. 1988)). 
208. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Burns 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
14:32.6 (West Supp. 1995). 
209. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6. 
210. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1994). 
211. See Dolan, supra note 206 (stating that anti-abortion advocates hail this 
decision as giving new rights to an unborn child). 
212. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 599. 
213. See id. at 604 (Kennard, J., concurring). 
214. See People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (Ct. App. 1976). 
215. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1995). Under the felony-murder 
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to the recommended feticide statute when the killing of a fetus 
is unintentional and without the person's knowledge that a 
fetus exists.21s Chief Justice Traynor's opinion in People v. 
Washington,217 echoed by Justice Mosk in his Davis dissent, 
correctly pointed out that the application of the felony-murder 
doctrine erodes the relation between criminal liability and 
moral culpability.218 Thus, the doctrine should not be "ex-
tended beyond any rational function· it was designed to 
serve.,,219 
Clearly, where a perpetrator· acts with knowledge and 
intent, it is rational to punish the actor for his or her purpose-
fully violent conduct. However, where one kills a fetus unin-
tentionally and without knowledge of its existence, the applica-
tion of the felony-murder rule to punish a defendant extends 
the rule beyond any rational function it was designed to 
serve.220 The California Legislature adopted the felony-mur-
der rule in 1872,221 whereas the killing of a fetus was not 
criminally proscribed until 1970.222 Thus, when it chose to 
criminalize unintentional killings that occur during the com-
mission of certain enumerated felonies, the California Legisla-
ture could not have envisioned that this statute would one day 
apply to fetuses. The application of the felony-murder rule in 
this instance would not only create unjust decisions, but would 
create irrational and undeserving punishments as well.223 
rule, a murder committed during a listed felony is murder in the first degree as a 
matter of law. [d. 
216. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Burns 1994). 
217. 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965). 
218. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 619 (citing People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130 
(Cal. 1965). 
219. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 619 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington, 402 
P.2d 130). 
220. See id. (citing People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965)). 
221. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988). 
222. See Stats. 1970, ch. 1311, § I, p. 2440. 
223. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 619 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Under the recommended 
statute, the defendant in Davis, would not be convicted for either feticide or felony 
murder. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
In People v. Davis,224 the California Supreme Court held 
that the viability of a fetus is not a required element of fetal 
murder under California Penal Code section 187(a).226 The 
court first explained why Roe v. Wade principles do not apply 
to the non-consensual third-party killing of a woman's fe-
tuS.226 Next, the Davis court analogized California to other 
states where viability is not a requirement for fetal murder 
and used this analogy to illustrate why such a statute is not 
unconstitutional. 227 
Although the supreme court held that viability is unneces-
sary to convict a defendant of fetal murder, it determined that 
its new statutory interpretation judicially enlarged the statute 
and would violate Robert Davis' due process rights if applied to 
him.228 Consequently, the court applied the former interpre-
tation of the statute. Since Davis had been prejudiced by the 
trial court's incorrect jury instruction pertaining to the former 
interpretation, the court reversed and remanded the Davis 
case for a new trial. 229 
The Davis court's new interpretation of section 187(a) 
threatens to have a bearing on abortion rights because the 
opinion has been interpreted by abortion activists as implicitly 
determining "when life begins" as well as giving the fetus 
rights independent of the mother. 230 Consequently, many 
"pro-life" advocates have interpreted the Davis decision as pre-
cedent for asserting that human life begins at conception and 
deserves separate, individual rights. These pro-life advocates 
consider Davis a victory for their cause, for they believe that 
224. 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994). 
225. [d. at 593. 
226. [d. at 597. The Davis court explained that the state has an interest in 
protecting the "potentiality of life," and a court may recognize an unborn fetus' 
interests in situations where these interests do not conflict with a mother's right 
to personal autonomy. [d. 
227. See id. at 598·600. 
228. Davis, 872 P.2d at 600. 
229. [d. at 600. 
230. See Maura Dolan, Assault Causing Miscarriage Can Be Murder, L.A. 
TIMES, May 17, 1994, at AI. 
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the Davis decision is an official recognition that a fetus is a 
human life at any stage of development.231 Some "pro-choice" 
advocates, to the contrary, have expressed disagreement with a 
law that treats the fetus as a victim i:J1dependent of the moth-
er.232 They fear that this ruling could pave the way for other 
legislation regulating the behavior of pregnant women.233 
These pro-choice advocates argue that lawmakers may even-
tually attempt to punish pregnant women for behavior, such as 
smoking and drinking, which is injurious to their fetuses. 234 
Whether or not these divergent viewpoints are warranted, the 
People v. Davis holding has set a controversial precedent that 
adds fuel to the fire of an already heated and passionate abor-
tion debate. 
Julie N. Qureshi' 
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232. See id. 
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